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Collapse of the Quebec Bridge, 1907 
Cynthia Pearson1 and Norbert Delatte, M.ASCE2 
Abstract: In the late 19th century, the transportation needs of Quebec led to proposals for bridging the St. Lawrence River. The Quebec 
Bridge was the longest cantilever structure attempted until that time. In its ﬁnal design, the clear span was 548.6 m (1,800 ft) long. The 
bridge project was ﬁnancially troubled from the beginning. This caused many setbacks in the design and construction. Construction ﬁnally 
began in October 1900. In August 1907, the bridge collapsed suddenly. Seventy ﬁve workers were killed in the accident, and there were 
only 11 survivors from the workers on the span. A distinguished panel was assembled to investigate the disaster. The panel’s report found 
that the main cause of the bridge’s failure was improper design of the latticing on the compression chords. The collapse was initiated by 
the buckling failure of Chord A9L, on the anchor arm near the pier, immediately followed by Chord A9R. Theodore Cooper had been the 
consulting engineer for the Quebec Bridge project, and most of the blame for the disaster fell on his shoulders. He mandated unusually 
high allowable stresses, and failed to require recalculation of the bridge dead load when the span was lengthened. 
CE Database subject headings: Collapse; Bridge failures; Canada; St. Lawrence River; Failure investigations. 
Introduction 
The Quebec Bridge was 20 years in the making, from the found­
ing of the Quebec Bridge Company in 1887 to the bridge’s col­
lapse in 1907. A cantilever bridge was proposed as the most fea­
sible design to bridge the harsh, icy waters of the St. Lawrence 
River. The bridge collapsed during construction on August 29, 
1907, killing 75 workers. Only 11 of the workers on the span 
were recovered alive. Some bodies were never found. A second 
attempt to bridge the St. Lawrence River was made. However, it 
also suffered a partial collapse when the middle span fell into the 
river. Thirteen workers were lost in the second collapse. The 
bridge was ﬁnally completed in 1917, and stands today. A recent 
review of the history of the bridge and the two collapses was 
written by Middleton (2001). 
Conception, Design, and Construction 
The St. Lawrence River was the main channel of trade for Quebec 
during the summer. During the winter, it ﬁlled with ice, and trade 
was completely cut off until the river iced over and travel was 
possible again across a dangerous ice bridge. The desire to bridge 
the St. Lawrence River was fueled by Quebec’s need to be com­
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petitive in trade. Montreal already had the Grand Trunk railway 
system, which passes through it from the west connecting it to 
Toronto. Quebec was left even farther behind when Montreal 
began construction in 1854 of the Victoria Bridge, which was 
completed in 1859, connecting it to western ports. This develop­
ment quickly established Montreal as Canada’s leading eastern 
port. Although the need was great, the job of bridging the St. 
Lawrence would prove to be no easy task (Middleton 2001, 
pp. 7–8). 
The St. Lawrence River was approximately 3.2 km (2 mi) 
wide at its narrowest section. Its waters were about 58 m (190 ft) 
deep at its middle. The velocity of the river reached 13 or 
14 km/h (8 or 9  mi/h) at times, and the tides ranged as high 
as 5 m  (18 ft). During the winter, ice became stuck in the 
narrowest part of the channel and piled up as high as 15 m (50 ft) 
(Middleton 2001, p. 3). 
Interest in building the Quebec Bridge arose as early as 1850. 
However, the project did not gather momentum until 1887, when 
a group of businessmen and political leaders came together and 
formed the Quebec Bridge Committee. Due to the high level of 
interest in the project, the Canadian Parliament passed an act, 
which incorporated the committee into the Quebec Bridge Com­
pany, with $1 million capital and the power to issue bonds 
(Middleton 2001, p. 27). 
The company now faced the problem of ﬁnancing the great 
bridge. Government funding was requested. However, no money 
could be awarded for the project until the bridge site was selected. 
With some ﬁnancial help from the local Quebec legislature, pre­
liminary surveys were made. In 1898, after years of debate, the 
Chaudiere site was selected from the three recommended sites to 
be the location of the Quebec Bridge. With a site selected, bridge 
design proposals poured in (Middleton 2001, p. 26). 
On June 16, 1897, the chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge 
Company wrote to a friend, who was also the president of the 
Phoenix Bridge Company (Holgate et al. 1908). In response, the 
Phoenix Bridge Company sent its chief engineer to meet with the 
Quebec Bridge Company’s chief engineer at an ASCE meeting in 
Quebec in 1897. The Phoenix Bridge Company offered to prepare 
Table 1. Key Individuals in Design and Construction of Quebec Bridge 
Name Title 
A. B. Milliken Bridge superintendent of erection for 1st year of work 
Benjamin A. Yensera General foreman of erection for remainder of project. Worked for Phoenix Bridge Company 
Arthur H. Birksa Resident engineer of erection 
Collingwood Schreiber Chief engineer for railways and canals 
David Reeves President of the Phoenix Bridge Company 
Edward Hoare Chief engineer for Quebec Bridge Company 
E. R. Kinloch Bridge erection inspector 
John Sterling Deans Chief engineer for Phoenix Bridge Company 
Norman McLure Bridge inspector, civil engineering graduate from Princeton, hired by Cooper 
Peter L. Szlapka Chief designing engineer for Phoenix Bridge Company 
Robert C. Douglas Bridge engineer for railways and canals 
Simon-Napoleon Parent President of the Quebec Bridge Company 
C. C. Schneider Commissioned to review design work on the bridge after the collapse 
Theodore Cooper Consulting engineer 
aDied in the collapse. 
plans for the bridge free of charge. In return, the Quebec Bridge 
Company would then be obligated to give the tender for construc­
tion of the bridge to the Phoenix Bridge Company. Theodore 
Cooper, who learned of the Quebec Bridge project at the ASCE 
meeting, offered his consulting services to the Quebec Bridge 
Company(Middleton 2001, pp. 32–33). Some of the key players 
in the construction and failure of the bridge are listed in Table 1. 
The chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge Company, Edward 
Hoare, had never before worked on a bridge longer than about 90 
m (300 ft). The company decided to hire a consulting engineer, 
and Theodore Cooper was selected from a list of six prominent 
engineers for the project (Holgate et al. 1908, p. 36.; Middleton 
2001). Theodore Cooper was an independent consultant operating 
out of New York City. He was one of the foremost American 
bridge builders of his day. To Theodore Cooper, this project 
would be the crowning achievement to his life’s work. 
Petroski (1995) notes Cooper’s strong qualiﬁcations for this 
project. In his long career, he had written an award-winning paper 
pioneering the use of steel for railway bridges, and had prepared 
general speciﬁcations for iron and steel bridges. His method of 
accounting for railroad loads on bridge structures became widely 
used (Middleton 2001, p. 37). 
Tenders were called for on September 6, 1898 and received 
until March 1, 1899 (Holgate et al. 1908). They were then 
reviewed by Cooper. The speciﬁcations called for a cantilever 
structure. The basic conﬁguration of a cantilever bridge is shown 
in Fig. 1. However, suspension bridge designs were allowed, pro­
viding they came with their own set of speciﬁcations. Earlier, 
noted French engineer Gustave Eiffel had considered the problem 
and found that a cantilever design would be superior to either a 
suspension or an arch bridge for the Quebec site (Middleton 2001, 
pp. 29–30). 
The concept of the cantilever structure was ﬁrst used in 1867. 
William Middleton gives a clear deﬁnition of a cantilever bridge 
in his book: “cantilever bridge: a bridge form based upon the 
cantilever principal. In its typical form cantilever arms projecting 
toward the center of the span from main piers are continuous with 
and counterbalanced by anchor arms extending between the main 
piers and anchor pier at each end. A simple span suspended be­
tween the two cantilever arms completes the structure. The weight 
of the suspended span and the cantilever arms is counterbalanced 
by that of the anchor arms and an anchorage embedded in the 
anchor pier.” (Middleton 2001, p. 175). 
Six tenders were submitted for the superstructure, and two for 
the substructure. After review, Theodore Cooper stated, “I hereby 
conclude and report that the cantilever superstructure plan of the 
Phoenix Bridge Company is the ‘best and cheapest’ plan and 
Fig. 1. Structural behavior of cantilever bridge 
Fig. 2. Quebec Bridge just before collapse (Modjeski et al. 1919 
used by permission of Library and Archives Canada, PA 029229) 
proposal submitted to me for examination and report.” (Holgate et 
al. 1908, p. 15., Middleton 2001, p. 34). 
The Phoenix Company had been in correspondence with 
Cooper throughout this process (Holgate et al. 1908). In addition, 
the Quebec Bridge Company was in favor of the Phoenix Bridge 
Company to win the tender (Tarkov 1986). This provides at least 
an impression that the process was not fair and open, even though 
Holgate et al. (1908) concluded “As to either party inﬂuencing 
Mr. Cooper or causing him to modify his ideas so as to favour any 
tender, such a suggestion is, in our opinion, quite out of the ques­
tion, and we believe that Mr. Cooper made his decisions and gave 
his opinions with absolute honesty” (Holgate et al. 1908, p. 15). 
Two months later the company awarded contracts to the Phoe­
nix Bridge Company for construction of the superstructure and to 
the Davis Firm for construction of the substructure. However, the 
Phoenix Bridge Company refused to sign a contract with the Que­
bec Bridge Company due to the ﬁnancial provisions, which left 
the bridge company open to considerable risk. Financial matters 
were ﬁnally resolved in 1903, when additional funds became 
available from a government grant. On June 19, 1903, a ﬁnal 
contract was entered into between the two companies, and the 
name of the Quebec Bridge Company was changed to the Quebec 
Bridge and Railway Company (Middleton 2001, pp. 45–47). 
The Quebec Bridge was the longest cantilever structure ever to 
be attempted during its day. It would bridge the St. Lawrence 
River approximately 14 km (9 mi) North of Quebec connecting 
into the Grand Trunk rail line. The cantilever arms would reach a 
distance of 171.5 m (562.5 ft). They were to support a suspended 
span with a length of 205.7 m (675 ft). It would stand 45.7 m 
(150 ft) above the river. The initial design clear span length was 
487.7 m (1,600 ft). 
However, in May 1900, this span was increased to 548.6 m 
(1,800 ft) by Theodore Cooper. He stated that this would elimi­
nate the uncertainty of constructing piers in such deep water, 
lessen the effects of ice, and shorten the time of construction of 
the piers. Although there were sound engineering reasons for this 
change, it was also true that the lengthening of the span would 
also make Cooper the Chief Engineer for the longest cantilever 
bridge in the world (Petroski 1995, p. 46; Middleton 2001). 
Construction of the bridge ofﬁcially began on October 2, 1900, 
after a grand ceremony. The Quebec Bridge Company had enough 
funds to begin erecting the substructure. The completed piers 
would stand approximately 8 m (26.5 ft) above the highest water 
Table 2. Bridge Member Deﬂections 
Date of 
Amount of deﬂection 
observation Member (mm) (in.) 
June 15 — 1.5–6.5 1/16  to  1 4 
June A3R and A4R 1.5–6.5 1/16  to  1 4 
June A7R and A8R 1.5–6.5 1/16  to  1 4 
June A8R and A9R 1.5–6.5 1/16  to  1 4 
June A8L and A9L 19 3 
4 
August 6 7L and 8L 19 3 
4 
August 8L and 9L 8 5/16 
August 20 8R Bent Bent 
August 9R and 10R — — 
August 23 5R and 6R 13 1 
2 
August 27 A9L 57 21 4 
level. The piers were made of huge granite facing stones with 
concrete backing. The top 5.8 m (19 ft) of each pier was made of 
solid granite. The piers were tapered 1 in 12 (1  in. / ft) until they 
reached the dimensions of 9.1 m (30 ft) by 40.5 m (133 ft) at the 
top. Each pier rested on a concrete ﬁlled caisson that was 14.9 m 
(49 ft) wide, 7.6 m (25 ft) high, and 45.7 m (150 ft) long, weigh­
ing 16.2 MN (1,600 t) (Middleton 2001, pp. 48–50). 
Due to the unprecedented size of this structure, innovative 
construction methods proved necessary. These were well docu­
mented in frequent reports, with extensive illustrations, in the 
Engineering Record (ENR 1907a,b,c,d,e). 
Under a separate contract with the Quebec Bridge Company, 
the Phoenix Bridge Company began the construction of the ap­
proach spans in 1902 and completed them in 1903. Erection of 
the superstructure portion of the bridge did not begin until July 
22, 1905. The Phoenix Bridge Company agreed to have the struc­
ture completed by the last day of the year in 1908. Otherwise, the 
company would pay $5,000/month after this deadline to the Que­
bec Bridge Company until the project was ﬁnished (Holgate et al. 
1908, Middleton 2001). 
Events Leading up to Collapse 
As the bridge was erected, workers and supervisors found notice­
able midpoint deﬂections in some of the chords. When the work­
ers tried to rivet the joints between these chords, the predrilled 
holes did not line up. In addition, bends (deﬂections) were ob­
served in some of the most heavily loaded compression members. 
Over time, some of the member deﬂections increased. 
The last photograph taken of the bridge before the collapse is 
shown in Fig. 2. The panels were numbered from 1, at the outer 
ends of the cantilever arms, through 10, at the piers. The anchor 
arm panels added the notation “A.” The A9L notation, therefore, 
refers to the chord located in the anchor arm, within the ninth 
panel, and on the left or west side of the bridge. Some of the 
major chords with their corresponding deﬂections, with the dates 
of measurement, are presented in Table 2. 
Deﬂections were ﬁrst noticed as early as mid-June, and were 
reported to Cooper by his on-site inspector, Norman McLure. 
Compression members had been cambered, so that under load the 
joints would line up and could be riveted together. However, 
some of the joints failed to close. Both men presumed that the 
relatively small deﬂections had occurred due to some unknown 
preexisting condition. They were not alarmed (Middleton 2001, 
p. 72). 
Subsequent inspections turned up more deﬂecting chords in 
August. Again, these were reported to Cooper on the same day 
that they were discovered. Cooper wired a message back referring 
to chords 7L and 8L, asking, “How did bend occur in both 
chords?” The chief engineer of the Phoenix Company replied to 
Cooper saying that he did not know (Middleton 2001, pp. 72–73). 
The chief design engineer for the Phoenix Company, Peter 
Szlapka, was certain that the bend was put in the chord ribs at the 
shop. He later admitted that he never actually saw the chords in 
question. However, Norman McLure wrote, “One thing I am rea­
sonably sure of, and that is that the bend has occurred since the 
chord has been under stress, and was not present when the chords 
were placed.” While this dispute of how the bend occurred in 
chords 7L and 8L was going on, McLure reported to Cooper 
another similar bend in chords 8L and 9L (Middleton 2001, pp. 
73–74). The members with these deﬂections were the lower 
chords of the truss on either side of the pier—the members with 
the highest compressive loads under the negative moment across 
the pier. 
A disturbing pattern was emerging. The members under the 
highest compressive loads were gradually buckling. These were 
built up with latticing, and as they deﬂected higher stresses were 
placed on the latticing as well as the rivets attaching the lattices to 
the main compression members. 
Being dissatisﬁed with the theories offered by the engineers on 
site, Cooper developed his own theory. “None of the explanations 
for the bent chord stand the test of logic. I have evolved another 
theory, which is a possible if not the probable one. These chords 
have been hit by those suspended beams used during the erection, 
while they were being put in place or taken down. Examine if you 
cannot ﬁnd evidence of the blow, and make inquiries of the men 
in charge.” McLure did as he was instructed, and reported back to 
Cooper that there was no evidence of such an incident (Middleton 
2001, p. 74). 
Some of the engineers were unconcerned about the problem, 
believing that it was nothing serious. Others were still insisting 
that the bends were the result of a preexisting condition. The 
manufacturer guaranteed that all the members had been perfectly 
straight when they left the yard. Another incident had occurred 
during the 1905 construction season, when chord A9L was 
dropped and bent while being handled in the storage yard. It was 
repaired and placed into the structure. Although at the time the 
repair was thought to be satisfactory, this member was later found 
to be the triggering cause of the collapse. 
Cooper, although the most experienced, seemed to be the most 
confused by the problem. He was 60 years old at the time he 
accepted the position of consulting engineer for the Quebec 
Bridge project. He also accepted the responsibility of shop in­
spector of the steel fabrication and erection. His health was poor 
and because of this, he never visited the site once construction 
began on the superstructure. His consulting services were based 
on the information that was reported to him by others in charge. 
Cooper’s ofﬁcial eyes and ears on the construction site was Nor­
man McLure, a young civil engineer who had been appointed by 
Cooper himself. Cooper was also very poorly compensated for his 
work (Petroski 1995; Middleton 2001). 
McLure continued to argue that the bends in the members had 
occurred after they were installed. Some of the workers had ob­
served the deﬂecting chords and were concerned enough to not 
report to work for a few days. However, when McLure and Coo­
per disagreed on the cause of the deﬂections, McLure did not 
have the conﬁdence to contradict Cooper. Work continued on the 
bridge. There had already been a 3 day strike over working con­
ditions, and the workers who had not agreed with the new terms 
had left. This greatly reduced the number of workers on the 
project, and there was concern that a temporary stoppage would 
cause more workers to leave and delay the project. 
After another routine inspection, chord A9L was placed under 
observation when its initial deﬂection of 19 mm (3/4  in.) had 
increased to 57 mm (2  1/4  in.) in less than 2 weeks. The opposite 
chord A9R was bent in the same direction. There was growing 
concern about the deﬂections. One of the construction foremen 
decided to halt work on the bridge until matters could be re­
solved. On August 27, the same day construction was halted, 
McLure sent a message to Cooper informing him that construc­
tion would not resume until he reviewed the matter. The next day, 
McLure went to New York to seek advice from Cooper 
(Middleton 2001, pp. 78–79). 
The erection foreman that had ordered the work to stop 
changed his mind, and with reassurance from Edward Hoare, the 
chief engineer of the Quebec Bridge Company, resumed work 
again that day. The only reason given for this decision was in a 
note from Hoare to Cooper stating, “the moral effect of holding 
up the work would be very bad on all concerned and might also 
stop the work for this season on account of losing the men.” Two 
days later, news of the matter reached the Phoenixville ofﬁce and 
the project superiors there met and discussed the problem. They 
relayed a message back by telephone, saying that it was safe to 
resume work on the bridge. They had somehow reached the con­
clusion that the bends in the chords had occurred before they left 
the yard. The Phoenix Company’s chief engineer had stated that 
the chord members were carrying “much less than maximum 
load.” 
In the meantime, McLure was meeting with Cooper in New 
York. Neither of the men was aware that construction had re­
sumed on the bridge. After a brief discussion between the two 
men on August 29, Cooper wired the Phoenixville ofﬁce saying, 
“Add no more load to the bridge until after due consideration of 
facts. McLure will be over at ﬁve o’clock.” Cooper’s reasoning 
for informing the Phoenixville ofﬁce rather than directly relaying 
it to the site, was that he felt that action would be taken faster if 
the information went to the site through Phoenixville. McLure 
had assured Cooper that he would wire the information to the site 
on his way to the Phoenixville ofﬁce. In his haste to get to his 
destination, he neglected to send the information. 
The message from Cooper reached the Phoenixville ofﬁce at 
1:15 p.m. It was ignored in the absence of the chief engineer. At 
around 3:00 p.m. Phoenixville’s chief engineer returned to his 
ofﬁce. After seeing the message, he arranged for a group meeting 
as soon as McLure arrived. McLure arrived at roughly 5:15 p.m. 
and the men discussed the circumstances brieﬂy before deciding 
to wait until the next morning to decide a course of action 
(Middleton 2001, pp. 78–80). 
Collapse 
Meanwhile, back at the construction site, at about the same time 
the decision makers in Phoenixville were ending their meeting, 
the Quebec Bridge collapsed at 5:30 p.m. The thunderous roar of 
the collapse was heard 10 km (6 m) away in Quebec (Middleton 
2001, p. 80). The entire south half of the bridge, approximately 
189 MN (19,000 t) of steel, fell into the waters of the St. 
Lawrence within 15 s. Eighty six workers were present on the 
Fig. 3. Wreckage (Modjeski et al. 1919 used by permission of 
Library and Archives Canada, C009766 and PA020614) 
bridge at the time. Only 11 workers on the span survived. 
The A9L bottom compression chord, which was already bent, 
gave way under the increasing weight of the bridge. The load 
transferred to the opposite A9R chord that also buckled. The piers 
were the only part of the structure that survived. The wreckage is 
shown in Fig. 3, looking from the south bank toward the pier. Of 
38 Caughnawaga Mohawk ironworkers who had left their village 
to work on the bridge, 33 were killed and two were injured 
(Middleton 2001, p. 84). 
Royal Commission Report 
The Governor General of Canada formed a Royal Commission, 
comprised of three civil engineers, whose sole task was to inves­
tigate the cause of the collapse. They were Henry Holgate, of 
Montreal, John George Gale Kerry of Campbellford, Ont., and 
John Galbraith of Toronto. Their completed report consisted of 
over 200 pages plus 21 appendices. As stated by Middleton 
(2001, p. 91) “…the thoroughness and objectivity of their inquiry 
and report stand even today as models of their kind.” 
The immediate cause of failure was found to be the buckling 
of compression chords A9L and A9R. The ofﬁcial report attrib­
uted the collapse to a number of reasons. Listed below are some 
of the major ﬁndings (Holgate et al. 1908, pp. 9–10): 
1.	 “The collapse of the Quebec Bridge resulted from the failure 
of the lower chords in the anchor arm near the main pier. The 
failure of these chords was due to their defective design.” 
2.	 “We do not consider that the speciﬁcations for the work were 
satisfactory or sufﬁcient, the unit stresses in particular being 
higher than any established by past practice. The speciﬁca­
tions were accepted without protest by all interested.” 
3.	 “A grave error was made in assuming the dead load for the 
calculations at too low a value and not afterwards revising 
this assumption. This error was of sufﬁcient magnitude to 
have required the condemnation of the bridge, even if the 
details of the lower chords had been of sufﬁcient strength, 
because, if the bridge had been completed as designed, the 
actual stresses would have been considerably greater than 
those permitted by the speciﬁcations. This erroneous as­
sumption was made by Mr. Szlapka and accepted by Mr. 
Cooper, and tended to hasten the disaster.” 
4.	 “The loss of life on August 29, 1907, might have been pre­
vented by the exercise of better judgement on the part of 
those in responsible charge of the work for the Quebec 
Bridge and Railway Company and for the Phoenix Bridge 
Company.” 
5.	 “The failure on the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway 
Company to appoint an experienced bridge engineer to the 
position of chief engineer was a mistake. This resulted in a 
loose and inefﬁcient supervision of all parts of the work on 
the part of the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company.” 
6.	 “The work done by the Phoenix Bridge Company in making 
the detail drawings and in planning and carrying out the erec­
tion, and by the Phoenix Iron Company in fabricating the 
material was good, and the steel used was of good quality. 
The serious defects were fundamental errors in design.” 
7.	 “The professional knowledge of the present day concerning 
the action of steel columns under load is not sufﬁcient to 
enable engineers to economically design such structures as 
the Quebec Bridge. A bridge of the adopted span that will 
unquestionably be safe can be built, but in the present state 
of professional knowledge a considerably larger amount of 
metal would have to be used than might be required if our 
knowledge were more exact.” 
Causes of Failure 
The fall of this massive bridge can be traced back to several 
technical factors. The top and bottom chords for the anchor and 
cantilever arms of a bridge were typically designed as straight 
members. This common practice made the fabrication of these 
members easier. The bottom chords for the anchor and cantilever 
arms in the Quebec Bridge were slightly curved, as shown in 
Fig. 2, for aesthetic reasons. This added difﬁculty to the fabrica­
tion of such unusually large members. The curvature also in­
creased the secondary stresses on the members, reducing their 
buckling capacity. According to a letter written to Engineering 
Record, “As a rule secondary stresses are much more dangerous 
in compression than in tension members, which seem to have 
Fig. 4. Cooper’s allowable compressive stresses for Quebec bridge 
(1 ksi=6.89 Mpa) 
been the ﬁrst to give way in the Quebec bridge” (“The Cause of 
the Quebec Bridge Failure” 1907d). 
Another concern during the erection of the bridge was the 
joints. The ends of all the chords were shaped to allow for the 
small deﬂections that were expected to occur when the chords 
came under their full dead load. These butt splices were bolted to 
allow for movement. The splices initially touched only at one end, 
and would not fully transfer their load until they had deﬂected 
enough for full bearing at the splices. At this point, they were to 
be permanently riveted in place. The result was to be a rigid joint 
that transferred loads uniformly across its area to ensure only 
axial loading. Great care had to be taken while working around 
these joints until they were riveted (Middleton 2001 pp. 70–72). 
Adding to the design problems, Cooper increased the original 
allowable stresses for the bridge. He allowed 145 MPa (21 ksi) 
for normal loading and 165 MPa (24 ksi) under extreme loading 
conditions. These were questioned by the bridge engineer for the 
railways and canals as being unusually high. The new units 
stresses were accepted based solely on Cooper’s reputation 
(Holgate et al. 1908). 
Cooper developed an allowable compressive stress formula (in 
psi) based on the slenderness ratio (l /r) of the member 
allowable compressive stress = 165 − 0.69(l/r) MPa 
= 24,000 − 100(l/r) psi (1) 
where l=length of compression member; r=radius of 
gyration=yI / A; I=moment of inertia; and A=cross-sectional 
area. 
Cooper’s formula is compared to contemporary allowable 
stresses from the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC 
1989) as well as the 96.5 MPa (14 ksi) compressive allowable 
stress adopted for the second bridge (Middleton 2001, p. 107) in 
Fig. 4. AISC curves are shown for both 230 MPa (33 ksi) and 250 
MPa (36 ksi) steel. Cooper’s allowable stresses are higher than 
those in use today by 3.3–8.7% over a range of slenderness ratios 
from 10 to 100. Given the lower and uncertain quality of the 
materials available to Cooper, along with the less developed state 
Table 3. Comparison of Assumed and Actual Dead Load 
of knowledge of compression members at that time and the lack 
of testing of compression members, Cooper’s formula represents 
an unsafe practice. 
The Quebec Bridge was an enormous structure, and very little 
was known as to how it would behave mechanically. The Quebec 
Bridge Company lacked funding to adequately perform testing. 
Cooper had required extensive tests on the eyebars, which formed 
major tension members in the top chords. He did not require the 
compression members to be tested. Later, Cooper would state the 
reason for this as being, “There is no machine or method existing 
by which any such test could be made” (Middleton 2001, p. 56). 
However, when the company did ﬁnally secure funds for testing, 
Cooper rejected the idea stating that too much time had been 
wasted already. 
Another oversight was that the stresses were not recalculated 
once Cooper increased the span from 487.7 m (1,600 ft) to 
548.6 m (1,800 ft). The stress calculations were based on the 
487.7 m (1,600 ft) span dimension. Once this error had been 
discovered and brought to Cooper’s attention, he immediately 
made an estimate of the new stresses that would occur. He found 
that they would be approximately 7% more. Weights were then 
recalculated from the new information. They were found to be as 
much as 10% in excess of those previously calculated (Middleton 
2001, p. 65). The initial design weight for the bridge was ex­
pected to be 276 MN (62 million lb). The real weight of the 
bridge was estimated at 325 MN (73 million lb), an increase of 
18% (Tarkov 1986). 
In the rush following the ﬁnal ﬁnancial arrangements of 1903, 
the necessity of revising the assumed weights was overlooked 
both by the engineers of the Phoenix Bridge Company and by 
those of the Quebec Bridge Company, with the result that the 
bridge members would have been considerably overstressed after 
completion. 
Table 3, based on the Royal Commission Report, compares the 
actual and assumed dead loads. “The difference between these 
two sets of concentrations indicate a fundamental error in the 
calculations for the bridge. In a properly computed bridge the 
assumed dead load concentrations upon which the makeup of the 
members is based should agree closely with the weight computed 
from the dimensions in the ﬁnished design and with actual 
weights” (Holgate et al. 1908). 
At the time this error was discovered, a large portion of the 
fabrication had been completed and a considerable amount of 
bridge erection was ﬁnished. Cooper accepted these heavier loads 
and stresses, in addition to the already high stresses set for the 
bridge, as being within acceptable limits. His only other alterna­
tives were to start over, strengthen the bridge in place, or abandon 
the project. 
Procedural and Professional Aspects 
Cooper insisted on retaining full control of the project, even 
at a considerable distance. Schreiber recommended that the 
Assumed dead load Actual dead load Difference 
Element (kN) (lb) (kN) (lb) (%) 
Half suspended span 
Cantilever arm 
Anchor arm 
21,538 
58,740 
59,240 
4,842,000 
13,205,200 
13,317,600 
25,328 
70,300 
77,034 
5,694,000 
15,804,000 
17,318,000 
17.6 
19.7 
30.0 
governmental agency of Railways and Canals hire a consultant on 
their behalf. This engineer would, in a sense, be double-checking 
Cooper’s work and ultimately have the ﬁnal authority. After ﬁnd­
ing this out, Cooper, the Quebec Bridge Company, and the Phoe­
nix Bridge Company immediately objected. In a letter to Edward 
Hoare, Cooper wrote, “This puts me in the position of a subordi­
nate, which I cannot accept” (Middleton 2001, p. 52). Cooper met 
with Schreiber personally. Following this meeting, Schreiber re­
vised his recommendation to eliminate the need to hire an addi­
tional project consultant. The new amended order-in-council to 
the Railways and Canals failed to deﬁne clearly how much au­
thority Cooper would have over the project. 
According to Middleton (2001, p. 53), “While there remained 
a requirement to submit all plans for the approval of the chief 
engineer of Railways and Canals, it was treated as a perfunctory 
formality. When later modiﬁcations to the speciﬁcations appeared 
desirable, Cooper made them without reference to the government 
engineers, and there was no evidence that Schreiber ever ques­
tioned a decision made by Cooper or interfered in any way with 
the work.” This opinion is supported by a statement in a letter 
from Deans to Cooper. In it he wrote, “The suggested action by 
Mr. Schreiber would place the business in a much worse condi­
tion than it was originally in.” He also wrote, “…it is simply 
being necessary to have Schreiber’s signature as a matter of 
form.” To further these implications, in a another letter from 
Deans to Cooper, he wrote, “I have written him again, (Schreiber) 
and urged him to stop entirely this proposed plan, and explaining 
that the sole purpose of the order in council was to give you the 
ﬁnal authority to settle all details, the government approval being 
a mere formality, and in this way save time which was so valu­
able” (Holgate et al. 1908). 
No clear chain of command existed. It was assumed that the 
ﬁnal authority rested with Theodore Cooper. All concerns were 
directed toward him, even though, due to illness, he was unable to 
travel to the job site. There was no one present on the job site 
qualiﬁed to oversee this type of work or in a position to make a 
decision, including a decision to stop work if conditions became 
unsafe. Whenever the need arose, the authorities on site would 
confer with each other before making any decision. In the few 
occasions where a decision had been reached, there was hesitation 
in carrying it out. The authors of the Royal Commission Report 
wrote, “It was clear that on that day the greatest bridge in the 
world was being built without there being a single man within 
reach who by experience, knowledge, and ability was competent 
to deal with the crisis” (Holgate et al. 1908). 
Capacity of Compression Members 
The commission had suspected that the A9L compression chord 
failed due to improper latticing. Compression tests were per­
formed on one-third scale models of the compression chords in 
November 1907 and January 1908 to verify this theory. The com­
pression chord members for the Quebec Bridge consisted of four 
multilayered ribs (Fig. 5). They were stiffened by the use of di­
agonal latticing to make them act as one unit. During testing, the 
lattice system failed explosively due to shearing of its rivets, im­
mediately followed by buckling of the chord. This conﬁrmed the 
commission’s ﬁndings that the chords were inadequately de­
signed. In Schneider’s opinion, “These members consist of four 
separate ribs, not particularly well developed as compression 
members, and their connections to each other are not of sufﬁcient 
strength to make them act as a unit” (Middleton 2001, p. 97). 
Fig. 5. Builtup compression members 
Schneider wrote in his report, which was published as an appen­
dix to the Royal Commission Report, “If a column is made up of 
several shapes or parts, they have to be connected in such a man­
ner that they will act as a unit. In an ideal column each part would 
take its share of the load and no connection would be required. In 
practice, however, as stated before, bending will occur before the 
buckling load is reached, causing shearing strains which have to 
be transferred through the connections, as latticing, tie plates, or 
cover plates. These connection parts have, therefore, to perform 
the same function as the web of a girder or the web system of a 
truss” (Holgate et al. 1908). 
This unprecedented large scale testing and studying of 
compression members and their connections led to major ad­
vancements in the ﬁeld of engineering. Bridge speciﬁcations were 
improved after this collapse (Shepherd and Frost 1995). Another 
advancement was the formation of two organizations, the Ameri­
can Institute for Steel Construction in 1921, and the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Ofﬁcials in 
1914. These organizations advanced the ﬁeld of engineering by 
providing the means to fund research, which had become too 
difﬁcult and expensive for fabricating companies to conduct on 
their own (Roddis 1993). 
Ethical Aspects 
Several ethical concerns can be pointed out in this case. The 
major one is that deformations went unheeded for so long. The 
engineers on site argued among themselves as to the cause. Al­
though the workers who failed to report to work because of the 
deformations lacked the technical expertise, they seemed to be the 
only ones who understood what was really happening to the 
bridge (Middleton 2001, p. 78). Engineers and others in charge 
must be open minded to the ideas of the laborers, many of which 
have years of experience. 
Another ethical concern was Cooper’s rejection of an indepen­
dent engineer to check his work. His decisions were not ques­
tioned, even when they seemed to be unusual. An independent 
consultant may not have allowed the higher than normal design 
stresses. Some of the other errors such as the underestimated dead 
loads and the failure to recheck the weight could have been dis­
covered before the bridge collapsed. In the end, “Cooper’s engi­
neering expertise became the sole factor that was relied upon for 
assuring structural integrity of the bridge” (Roddis 1993). 
Fig. 6. Completed Quebec bridge (used by permission of Library and 
Archives Canada, PA044740) 
Aftermath 
The lives of those involved with the Quebec Bridge, from the 
designers to the construction workers, were forever changed after 
the accident. None however was affected as much as the families 
of the ones who died and Theodore Cooper. Edward Hoare went 
to work for the National Transcontinental Railway Commission. 
John Deans continued to serve as chief engineer of the Phoenix 
Bridge Company. He eventually became vice president of the 
company. Szlapka continued his duties as chief designer for the 
Phoenix Company. Cooper withdrew from practice to live out a 
lonely retirement. He died only 2 days after the Prince of Wales 
ofﬁcially dedicated the completed Quebec Bridge (Middleton 
2001) (see Fig. 6). 
Second Bridge 
After the collapse, the government took over the design and con­
struction of the new bridge. This also provided the ﬁnancial sup­
port for the project. The second bridge was substantially heavier 
than the ﬁrst. Petroski (1995) compares dimensions of the two 
bridges, showing the dramatic increase in member sizes. The 
cross-sectional area of the critical compression member for the 
old bridge had been 543,000 mm2 (842 in.2), whereas that of the 
new bridge was 1,250,000 mm2 (1,941 in.2) (Petroski 1995, 
p. 113; Middleton 2001, p. 116). 
The second attempt to bridge the St. Lawrence also encoun­
tered problems. The project suffered a second collapse in 1916, 
when a casting in the lifting apparatus broke, causing the center 
suspended span to fall into the water as it was being hoisted into 
place from a barge. Thirteen workers lost their lives in this acci­
dent. The 50 MN (5,000 t) span sank to the bottom of the river to 
rest beside the wreckage of the ﬁrst bridge, which still remains 
there today. The second bridge was ﬁnally completed in 1917 and 
weighed two and a half times as much as the ﬁrst one (Tarkov 
1986). The construction of the second bridge was very well docu­
mented by a Report of the Government Board of Engineers, 
Canada Department of Railways and Canals (Modjeski et al. 
1919). 
Conclusions 
At Quebec, the greatest bridge in the world was under construc­
tion in 1907 under severe ﬁnancial constraints, with inadequate 
funds provided for either engineering work or the bridge con­
struction itself. These constraints had delayed engineering analy­
sis and led to adoption of unconservative speciﬁcations. When the 
miscalculation of the dead load was identiﬁed, the measures taken 
to reanalyze the structure were not adequate. On this project, 
virtually every conﬂict between safety and economy was resolved 
in favor of economy. Most of the poor engineering decisions were 
made by the prominent consulting engineer, Theodore Cooper. 
Cooper’s reluctance to travel to the site, based on his poor 
health, led to confusion about responsibility and site supervision. 
When skilled ironworkers observed the growing deﬂections, indi­
cating a gradual collapse of the structure, a conﬁdent site super­
visor might have realized the gravity of the situation and halted 
construction. However, the engineers on the site lacked the con­
ﬁdence and the authority to contradict Cooper’s judgments. 
The Royal Commission Report, which investigated the col­
lapse and identiﬁed the engineering and procedural errors that had 
lead to it, remains a pioneering document in the ﬁeld of forensic 
engineering. The lessons learned from the case had many impor­
tant impacts on the engineering profession, particularly in Canada 
and the United States. 
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